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ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY IN ESCHEAT AND THE
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ANDREW W. MOTHENIA, JR.**
DAVID J. EPSTEIN***
I. INTRODUCTION
States throughout the country are scrambling to fill their coffers with
billions of dollars in unclaimed funds unknowingly left in the possession
of literally every business in the United States. While unclaimed prop-
erty holders, courts, commentators and others have often assumed that
the Supreme Court in Texas v. New Jersey1 limited the right to claim aban-
doned property to the state of last known address of the owner, a careful
analysis of the holding does not support this conclusion. This article will
examine the ability of a state to claim abandoned intangible property and
to exclude the claims of other states to that same property. In 1981, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved
and recommended for enactment the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act
(the "Act") which offers a resolution of these issues different from the
resolution contained in the previous Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act.2 The ability of one state to claim abandoned intangible prop-
erty and to exclude the claims of rival states to the same property poses
vexing questions of sovereignty, jurisdiction and priority of claims.
While this article is limited to issues bearing on the right of a state
to claim property and the ability of a state to secure its claims, a brief
* Copyright 1983 by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. Materials are substantially similar
to materials to appear in Unclaimed Property and Reporting Forms, to be published by
Matthew Bender & Co., in March, 1984.
** Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. A.B. 1958, Washington and Lee
University; M.A. 1960, Columbia University; LL.B. 1963, Washington and Lee University
School of Law. McThenia was a member of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and a member of the Drafting Committee.
*** Attorney, Los Angeles, California. B.A. 1961, University of California at Berkeley;
J.D. 1964, University of California School of Law at Los Angeles. Epstein specializes in
unclaimed property law.
The authors served as co-reporters in the drafting of the 1981 Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act. The views expressed in this article, however, are those of the authors alone.
1 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
2 See Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (1954); Uniform Unclaimed Prop-
erty Act (1981). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws prom-
ulgated the original Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act in 1954. The Commis-
sioners made some minor amendments in 1966. The portions of the 1954 Act pertinent to
this article remained unchanged following the 1966 amendments. Available records do not
indicate the reasons that the Uniform Laws Conference did not consider the impact of Texas
v. New Jersey at the time of the 1966 revision. The authors speculate that the 1966 amend-
ments, which were made at the request of the traveler's check and money order issuers,
were substantially completed prior to the Supreme Court decision.
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discussion of modern unclaimed property doctrine is provided to assist
the analysis. Accordingly, Section I of the article consists of a brief
historical sketch of the roots of modern unclaimed property doctrine,
escheat and bona vacantia, as well as a brief examination of current
unclaimed property laws. The peculiar nature of intangible property, a
chose in action with no apparent situs, has given rise to conflicting claims
of sovereignty. Section II of this article examines the Supreme Court cases
leading up to Texas v. New Jersey that have wrestled with the problems
of escheat of intangible property. Texas v. New Jersey marked a change
in direction by the Supreme Court and raised some difficult problems with
existing abandoned property legislation, including the 1954 Uniform Act.
A major reason for the 1981 revision of the Uniform Act was to conform
the Act to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. New
Jersey. Section III of this article considers Texas v. New Jersey and the
1981 revision of the Act.
While the controlling principle of Texas v. New Jersey, that unclaimed
property is an asset of the lost creditor and is subject to claim by the
state of the creditor's last known address, is easy to articulate, implemen-
tation of that principle by statutory enactment is not so simple. Varying
business practices of obligors (holders), limitations on state power to com-
pel reporting, and costs of collection are significant factors that make ef-
forts to carry out the priority scheme of Texas precarious. Section IV of
this article reviews those provisions of the 1981 Uniform Act that con-
cern the states' authority to claim abandoned property, or state sover-
eignty, and the states' ability to effectively assert its claims. While the
1981 Act's provisions permitting the assertion of claims to abandoned prop-
erty go beyond the bare rule of Texas v. New Jersey, the provisions are
fully consistent with the philosophy of that decision and provide a com-
prehensive scheme for the assertion of claims to abandoned property.
II. ESCHEAT, BONA VACANTIA AND MODERN
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LEGISLATION
At common law, the lands of a tenant who died without heirs escheated
to the feudal lord or, in the absence of a mesne lord, to the Crown itself.'
' See Garrison, Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35 KY.
L.J. 302, 302 (1947); Sentell, Escheat, Unclaimed Property, and the Supreme Court, 17 W.
RES. L. REV. 50,50 & n.4 (1965); Note, Origins and Development ofModernEscheat, 61 COLUM.
L. REV. 1319, 1319-20 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Escheat]. The courts originally developed
escheat to assure continued performance of services to the lord as consideration for the
grant of land from lord to tenant in fee. Escheat, supra, at 1319-20. If the tenant died without
heirs, by definition no member of the tenant's line existed to perform the required serv-
ices. Id. Consequently, the land reverted to the tenant's immediate lord. Id. at 1320. If the
King was the tenant's immediate lord, or if the immediate lord could not be determined,
escheat operated in favor of the Crown. Id.
Escheat developed initially as a doctrine applicable only to real property held in fee.
F. ENEVER, BONA VACANTIA 15 (1927); Garrison, supra, at 303; Escheat, supra, at 1327. The
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Certain ownerless personal property also passed directly to the sovereign
under the doctrine of bona vacantia The Crown's claim to realty was
based on its right as lord paramount. Royal claim to personalty was
predicated on the absence of, or abandonment by, the owner, rather than
the Crown's status as an ultimate owner. In this country, the Crown's
claims of sovereignty were assumed by the states.' All states provide for
the escheat of real property. Title to the property ultimately vests in the
state after the expiration of statutorily prescribed time periods for mis-
sing heirs to assert claims. Modern legislation is based on the concept
of abandonment and seeks to assert control over a wide array of tangible
and intangible property.'
Unclaimed property legislation generally covers all forms of abandoned
intangible property, including bank deposits, savings accounts, stocks,
bonds, dividends, utility deposits, and insurance drafts.' The broad reach
of the 1954 Uniform Act is typical, covering "all intangible property...
held, issued or owing in the ordinary course of a holder's business."8 States
have become increasingly aware that unclaimed property is big business
both financially and politically.' Unclaimed property represents possibly
common law doctrine of bona vacantia applied to personalty in situations otherwise calling
for escheat. See infra note 4 (explanation of bona vacantia). Current statutes do not preserve
the distinction between realty and personalty, therefore, escheat is applicable to personal-
ity. See infra note 8 (§9 of Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act).
' Escheat, supra note 3, at 1326. Originally, bona vacantia applied only to personalty.
Id. Bona vacantia enabled the Crown to claim personalty against all but the rightful owner.
Id. If a person died without heirs, the Crown could claim the decedent's personal property.
See id. at 1327. The Crown claimed as custodian for the rightful owner and had a more
equitable claim than that of a stranger. Id. at 1326-27. If no rightful owner existed, or if
none appeared to claim the property, the Crown kept title. Id.; see generally id. at 1326-31.
5 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 435-36 & nn.5-6 (1951). "As a broad
principle of jurisprudence ... a state ... may use its legislative power to dispose of prop-
erty within its reach, belonging to unknown persons." Id. at 435-36. States remain free
to escheat property provided the state operates within state and federal constitutional limits.
See Cunnius v. Reading School Dist, 198 U.S. 458,471-72 (1905). States assert escheat rights
under their police power as protectors of their citizens. Escheat, supra note 3, at 1320. A
state, however, must exercise its powers by legislation. In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v.
Slattery, the court refused to apply the doctrine of bona vacantia to unclaimed telephone
rate refunds since no unclaimed property legislation existed in the state. 102 F.2d 58, 68
(7th Cir. 1939). The court held that the doctrine of bona vacantia was too uncertain and
indefinite to be declared a part of the common law of Illinois. Id.
' See Note, Unclaimed Property-A Potential Source of Non-Tax Revenue, 45
Mo.L. REv. 493,500-501 (1980) [hereinafter cited as UnclaimedProperty] (explaining wide scope
of Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act S 9 (1954)); Uniform Unclaimed Property
Act 1(10) (1981) (defining "intangible property" broadly for purpose of Act)).
See, e.g., Uniform Unclaimed Property Act § 1(10) (1981).
Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed PropertyAct 5 9 (1954). The comment to § 9 describes
the section as an "omnibus" provision covering all intangible personal property not other-
wise covered by the 1954 Act. Id. § 9, comment. The only limitation on the scope of the
1954 Act, besides time limitations, is the requirement that the property be "held or owing
in the ordinary course of the holder's business." Id.
I N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1982, at 30, col. 1.
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the single largest source of non-tax revenue now available to financially
strapped states. Additionally, the return of unclaimed property to consti-
tuents offers real political rewards. States pursuing aggressive policies
to locate missing owners have been able to return as much as fifty to
sixty percent of the value of savings accounts initially reported as aban-
doned property by banks."
While precise information on the total value of unclaimed property
outstanding is unavailable, in 1962 the Wall Street Journal reported a
figure of fifteen billion dollars, growing at the rate of one billion dollars
annually. States with aggressive programs have recovered significant
sums of money. For instance, in 1978 California took in more than thirty-
two million dollars and over the last three years Massachusetts has
recovered in excess of fifty-five million dollars. 2 Presently the states are
holding an estimated 1.2 billion dollars in unclaimed property."
All but two states have some form of unclaimed property legislation
covering various types of intangibles that have remained unclaimed by
the owner for a statutory period. 4 Following a prescribed period of dor-
mancy, the property is presumed abandoned and then is reported to the
state." If reunification efforts are unsuccessful, amounts remaining un-
claimed are ultimately turned over to the state. A few states have escheat
laws that provide for a period of custody during which the owner can
appear and redeem his property. After the period of custody, the state
initiates formal escheat proceedings that vest absolute ownership in the
state. 8 Most statutes, however, are purely custodial in nature. The state
"0 Letter from Jim Lord, Minnesota State Treasurer (1982) [hereinafter cited as Letter
from Lord], on file at Washington and Lee Law Review office; Letter from Paul Shanley,
Chief Legal Counsel to Massachusetts State Treasurer (1982) [hereinafter cited as Letter
from Shanley], on file at Washington and Lee Law Review office.
II Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1962, at 1, col. 1.
12 See Letter from Shanley, supra note 10.
13 See Letter from Lord, supra note 10.
1 Uniform Unclaimed Property Act prefatory note, at 5 (1981). Neither Colorado nor
Missouri has a comprehensive statute covering unclaimed intangible personal property.
Colorado's applicable statute only covers automobiles. COLO. REV. STAT. S 42-16-101 to
46-16-107 (Supp. 1981). See Unclaimed Property, supra note 6, at 497-502, 509-10 (comparing
1954 Act to Missouri's existing statutes and concluding that Missouri should adopt 1954
Act). Ohio law has scattered code sections relating to escheat.
15 Compare Uniform Unclaimed Property Act § 2 (1981) (general period of dormancy
five years, yet, SS 4, 8, 9, 13, 15 allow for one-year period for certain types of property
and fifteen-year period for travelers checks), with Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Prop-
erty Act S 2 (1954) (general period of dormancy seven years). But see id. SS 2(c), 6 (providing
two-year period for property held by dissolved business association and fifteen years for
travelers checks).
1" See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:37-12, 37-13 (West Supp. 1981). The formal escheat
proceedings include court trial, see N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2A:37-17 (West 1952), and adequate
notice to the unknown owner of the property, id. S 2A:37-18, 37-19. New Jersey also allows
the unknown owner to reopen his claim against the state for two years after final judgment
in the escheat proceeding. Id. S 2A:37-28 (West Supp. 1981). Cf. supra note 17 (states generally
have custodial and not escheat statutes, allowing unknown owner to claim at any time).
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remains a perpetual custodian for the owner and never claims title to the
property. The 1981 Uniform Act, like its predecessor, is a custodial statute
and applies generally to all intangible property.'
The operative procedures of custodial unclaimed property laws are
quite simple. Assume that W.C. Fields, while enroute from Philadelphia,
got off the train for a few minutes in Smalltown and opened a checking
account.'8 As was his custom, W.C. Fields got back on the train, went
to Philadelphia and forgot all about the account with Smalltown Bank.
The legislature has said that after a requisite number of years, generally
seven, an account like W.C. Fields' is presumed abandoned. The relation-
ship between Smalltown Bank and Fields is, in banking law terms, that
of debtor-creditor. In terms of abandoned property legislation the rela-
tionship is that of owner-holder. Smalltown Bank is an obligor or "holder"
and is indebted to Fields on an obligation subject to the state unclaimed
property law. The bank is required to attempt to locate Fields and reunite
him with his property. If those reunification efforts fail, the bank must
report the existence of the property to the state.'9 The state subsequently
must attempt to locate the missing owner, Fields, by a combination of
mail and advertising notices.' If the state cannot locate Fields, Smalltown
Bank is required to pay the amount owing to Fields over to the state
and Smalltown Bank is relieved of liability." Most states hold the pro-
ceeds from the property in the general fund subject to later claim by
owners like Fields who subsequently appear."
III. CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY
States possess the right to determine the mode of acquisition and
transfer of property and the rules for succession to ownership of prop-
erty under the perogative of sovereignty. States may subject debts owed
" Uniform Unclaimed Property Act prefatory note, at 5 (1981) (1981 Act custodial in
nature).
,1 W.C. Fields apparently went through life with a constant fear of poverty. At an
early age he decided to open a bank account everywhere he went. "Sometimes he hopped
off trains and opened an account while the engine took on water. He piled the bank-books
in a corner in his wardrobe trunk, and, for the most part forgot them." R.L. TAYLOR, W.C.
FIELDS 58-60 (London 1950). At one time he had, according to his own estimate, 700 accounts
in banks all over the world. At the time of death 30 accounts were located by his executors. Id.
" See Uniform Unclaimed Property Act S 17 (1981); Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act S 11 (1954).
"See Uniform Unclaimed Property Act § 18 (1981); Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act § 12 (1954).
" See Uniform Unclaimed Property Act § 19 (1981); Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act S 13 (1954).
" See Uniform Unclaimed Property Act § 23 (1981); Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act § 17 (1954). Several states have made special provisions for deposit of the
funds from unclaimed property. For example, in Wisconsin, the school fund receives the
unclaimed property. Wis. STAT. § 177.18 (1977). In Illinois, the State Pension Fund is the recip-
ient. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 141 § 118 (1961).
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to unknown persons to claims of sovereignty.' Most assertions of
sovereignty over realty and tangible personalty present no problems of
competing state claims since the state may reach property located within
its borders. States encounter greater difficulties when claiming intangi-
ble property. The issue is under what circumstances a state may reach
intangible property belonging to unknown persons. A holder domiciled
in State A, with its principal place of business in State B, may owe un-
claimed intangible property to a missing owner whose last known address
is in State C. Any or all of these states could make a colorable claim to
the property.24 Judicial authority lends support to the claims of the
domiciliary state and the state of last known address.' Congressional
legislation supports the claim of the state of principal place of business
in the case of money orders."
Much of the difficulty in establishing limits on sovereignty results
from attempts to create a fictional situs for an intangible chose in action
which has no real situsY A state claiming intangible property traditionally
' Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660, 664 (1911); see supra note 5 (state
sovereignty).
2 See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 676, 677, 679-82 (1965) (claims were made
by state of corporate domicile, state of principal place of business, and state of creditor's
last known address); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 429 (1951) (claim by
state of corporate domicile); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 548,
549 (1948) (claim by state of creditor's last known address). See generally Note, Texas v.
New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965)-Escheat of Intangibles, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 550, 554-56 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Escheat of Intangibles].
I See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 680-82 (1965) (upholding claim of state of
creditor's last known address); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 442 (1951)
(upholding claim of state of corporate domicile); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,
333 U.S. 541, 548, 549 (1948) (upholding claim of state of creditor's last known address).
See Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Travelers' Checks, Pub. L. No.
93495, SS 603, 604, 88 Stat. 1525, 1525-26 (1974)(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (1976)).
Following the decision in Pennsylvania v. New York, holding that the state of corporate
domicile was entitled to escheat money orders when no last known address of the pur-
chaser existed although the property had been purchased in other states, Congress enacted
legislation providing that the state of purchase may claim money orders and traveler's checks
even without any record of the last known address of the purchaser. See 407 U.S. 206 (1972)
(Pennsylvania); 12 U.S.C. SS 2501 et seq. (1976). If the state of purchaser did not claim, the
property could be taken by the state of principal place of business of the holder. Id.
Texas v. New Jersey was the first case in which the Court faced actual competing claims
by states. See infra notes 70-133 and accompanying text. Both in Standard Oil and in Con-
neeticut Mutual the claim of only one state was before the Court. See infra notes 41-53
and accompanying text.
" See Severnoe Sec. Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-24, 174
N.E. 299, 300 (1931).
The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction, but there are times when justice
or convenience requires that a legal situs be ascribed to them. The locality selected
is for some purposes, the domicile of the creditor; for others, the domicile or place
of business of the debtor, the place, that is to say, where the obligation was created
or was meant to the discharged; for others, any place where the debtor can be
found. At the root of the selection is generally a common sense appraisal of the
requirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions. (citations omitted).
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UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT
would base its claim on a fictional situs within the state's borders.28 Other
states could construct equally plausible fictions. For instance, in the ex-
ample above, State A, the state of corporate domicile, could claim that
the situs of the debt was within its boundaries because all corporate trans-
actions "originate" there.' State B, the holder's principal place of business,
could claim that because the holder transacted the most business in B,
the holder's obligations must be located in B as well.3 0 Finally, State C,
the state of last known address of the owner, could argue that since the
property was an asset of the creditor, the situs was in the state where
the creditor resided." The early unclaimed property legislation, however,
did not raise these questions of sovereignty because the initial state claims
were generally local in character. Only later did conflicting claims to pro-
perty arise. The following paragraphs briefly trace the history of the ma-
jor unclaimed property cases in the United States Supreme Court.
In the early twentieth century, several states exercised sovereignty
and passed unclaimed property or escheat laws applicable to dormant ac-
counts in savings institutions and banks. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of one of the earliest of these statutes in Provident In-
stitution for Savings v. Malone2 Massachusetts had enacted a statute
authorizing the state to take custody of dormant savings accounts. The
statute required the state to hold money received in custody subject to
the claim of the rightful owner. The holder contested the authority of
the state to require the turnover of a depositor's account. In rejecting
the holder's argument, the Malone Court noted that the Massachusetts
statute was custodial and that the owner could always claim his money
from the state.33
A few years later, the Supreme Court was called upon to review a
California escheat statute, the application of which also was limited to
dormant bank accounts. In the first case from California, First Nat'l Bank
of San Jose v. California,34 the Court disallowed the escheat of deposits
in a national bank, primarily because the Court believed state escheat
legislation would interfere with the congressional purpose of establishing
a national banking system. In the same year, however, the Court in Secur-
ity Say. Bank v. California,3 5 upheld the validity of the California escheat
statute as applied to state bank deposits. In Security Savings, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, writing for the Court, made it clear that, if minimal due pro-
Id. ... intangible property, such as a debt.., is not physical matter which can be located
on a map." See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 676 (1965).
2 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 430, 438 (1951) (claimant
maintained debt's situs was in state of corporate domicile).
" See id.
' See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 680 (1965).
SI See id. at 677, 680-82; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 548,
549 (1948).
221 U.S. 660, 666 (1911).
Id. at 664, 665.
262 U.S. 366, 370 (1923).
263 US. 282, 285-86 (1923).
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cess safeguards were provided to protect the depositor's legitimate in-
terests, whether the state actually escheated the property or merely
transferred custody to itself was irrelevant.36 In 1944, the Court in Ander-
son Nat'l Bank v. Luckett,3 7 permitted Kentucky to take custody of un-
claimed accounts in a national bank. The Court distinguished First Nat'l
Bank of San Jose v. California on the somewhat disingenuous ground that
the California statute was an escheat statute, disregarding the fact that
the Kentucky statute also provided for a possible ultimate escheat. The
Luckett Court permitted the most minimal due process steps and made
clear that any due process distinction between custodial and escheat
statutes was at best a technical one.
Supreme Court cases reviewing state unclaimed property statutes
generally point in one direction, indicating the Court's willingness to uphold
state legislative efforts to acquire abandoned property whether by for-
mal escheat or custodial taking. The Supreme Court's continuity remained
with the post-World War II cases, but with an added dimension. In the
cases dealing with bank accounts, the state that chartered the bank, or
the state in which a national bank was located, sought to claim deposits
left inactive by bank customers. Courts generally assumed, without discus-
sion, that the state in which the deposit had been made could claim the
property, since in all likelihood the proceeds belonged to residents of that
state. 8 No other state sought to claim these accounts. The dispute was
solely between the holder and the state of the holder's principal place
of business. While the Supreme Court had regularly confirmed the right
of the states to take bank deposits, the Court did not consider the possibil-
ity of competing claims by other states, particularly with regard to other
types of abandoned property. Conflicting claims, however, inevitably would
occur as the states' appetites for unclaimed property as a source of revenue
increased.
Following World War II, states, recognizing the potential for substan-
tial revenues, began to enact broad custodial statutes encompassing all
kinds of unclaimed property and using various tests of sovereignty to claim
the property.3 9 Widespread legislative activity gave birth to many aban-
doned property programs and breathed new life into existing programs.
States began to make broad claims of sovereignty against holders who
did business in numerous states. Courts needed some test to determine
I See id. at 285, 287, 289-90 (procedural safeguards included notice by publication before
trial, allowance of intervention by any interested party, and five-year period to reclaim
property after final adjudication). See also Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233,
241-42, 247 (1944) (citing Security Savings favorably for example of due process requirements).
Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 252 (1944).
But see First Nat'l Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 370 (1923). In First
National, the Court found that California's escheat statute was an unconstitutional interference
with national banks and observed that the depositors of a national bank often live in many
different states. Id.
' See Garrison, supra note 3, at 315; Shestack, Disposition of Unclaimed Property-A
Proposed Model Act, 46 ILL. L. REv. 48, 49 (1952).
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the legitimacy of a state's claim of sovereignty. The judiciary framed an
analysis based on the state's contacts with the obligation. The contacts
test provided a pragmatic means to determine the legitimacy of state
claims of sovereignty. Contacts analyses succeeded if only one state claimed
the property. The post-World War II cases, however, pushed the contacts
theory beyond its effective limits. It was only a matter of time until ac-
tual conflicts would arise, since state courts were simply unwilling to find
that the forum state lacked sufficient contacts." When the Supreme Court
40 See New Jersey v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 29 N.J. Super. 116, 101 A.2d
598 (1953). In American-Hawaiian, the court said with reference to the escheat of wages
earned in New Jersey and payable by a foreign corporation authorized to do business in
New Jersey:
It is apparent that New Jersey is not the only state which has contact with
the subject matter. The substance of defendants' position is that New Jersey's
interest is not such as to exclude the authority of another state to escheat the
same property and hence there looms the prospect of double escheat. In fact, New
Jersey's claim ultimately to escheat wages earned elsewhere from its domestic
corporations as well thus to escheat wages earned here from foreign corporations,
postulates a like power in another state to escheat wages earned there from New
Jersey corporations and wages earned here from corporations of that other state.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet formulated a test for deter-
mining the respective rights of several states where each has contact with the
intangible and each is in a position to effect seizure by personal service of process
upon the debtor within its jurisdiction. In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 682, 92 L. Ed. 863 (1948), it was held that New
York could act with respect to proceeds of insurance policies issued by a foreign
corporation for delivery in New York on lives of persons resident in New York
at the time of delivery. And in the Standard Oil case (State, by Parsons v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950); affirmed 341 U.S. 428, 71 S. Ct. 822,
95 L. Ed. 1078 (1951)) the possibility of a superior claim in another state was held
not to invalidate the escheat by New Jersey. This seems necessarily to follow
from the conclusion that although the debtor was entitled to the protection of
the full faith and credit clause, yet another state was nonetheless free to assert
its claim against the escheating state in the Federal Supreme Court. 341 U.S.,
at page 443, 71 S. Ct. 822, 95 L. Ed. 1078.
Hence New Jersey's right to escheat does not depend upon a nice weighing
of the respective contacts of this and another state. New Jersey's contact being
substantial, its power to escheat the property as against defendant seems clear,
albeit that in a later proceeding between contending states superiority of claim
may be found in another state.
Moreover it cannot be assumed that a mere superiority of interest will carry
an exclusive right to the property. The final solution may be an equitable pro-
rating between or among the interested states. And further, it may be that the
state which acts first will prevail. Unseemly as a race among states may be, it
is not uncommon for the law to reward the vigilant and this rule may here apply
even though its usual application occurs between private litigants....) I& at 608-609.
The American-Hawaiian court formulated what might be termed "the devil
take the hind-most" theory of escheat. The theory's effects are evidenced by the
fact that the New Jersey courts held that New Jersey had the power to escheat
unclaimed dividends of a New Jersey corporation payable to stockholders whose
last known addresses are in other states. New Jersey v. American Sugar Refin-
ing Co., 20 N.J. 286,119 A.2d 767 (1956). New Jersey courts also ruled that unclaimed
dividends of foreign corporations are payable to stockholders whose last known
143719831 -
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faced legitimate competing claims, the use of a contacts analysis to resolve
the conflict proved unworkable.
The first Supreme Court contacts case arose in the 1940s when New
York attempted to assert custody over the proceeds of unclaimed insurance
policies issued on the lives of New York residents by companies incor-
porated in other states. Nine of the companies sought to declare the New
York unclaimed property statute invalid. In Connecticut Mutual Life In-
surance Co. v. Moore,41 the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the
New York statute and permitted New York to take the unclaimed in-
surance proceeds. The insurers asserted that the statute impaired the
obligation of their contracts with policy holders since it dispensed with
proof of death and surrender of the policy, and that the statute violated
due process because only the state of corporate domicile possessed the
power to escheat.42 The Supreme Court, pursuing a contacts analysis, con-
cluded that New York had sufficient contacts with the property to claim
the property, and further noted that New York had a better claim than
anyone other than the owner, including the insurer. The Court expressly
declined to consider the priority of other states' possibly competing claims,
such as the potential claim of the state in which potential beneficiaries
resided.41 Since the New York statute in Connecticut Mutual was custodial,
the property always would be available for later claim by some other state.
Justice Frankfurter nevertheless dissented, urging that the Court should
have declined to decide the ownership issue because of the possibility of
prejudice to unrepresented interests. Justice Frankfurter suggested that
the Supreme Court, exercising its original jurisdiction, would be the proper
forum for resolving conflicting claims.4 4 Justice Jackson also dissented,
complaining that the Court "[i]n sustaining the broad claims of New York
... either cut[s] off similar and perhaps better rights of escheat by other
states or . .. render[s] insurance companies liable to two or more payments
of their single liability."45 Justice Jackson chastised the Court for failing
to address fully the extent of state power over abandoned property and
prophesied the confusion that became manifest in future cases.46
addresses are in New Jersey. New Jersey v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 45 N.J. Super.
259, 132 A.2d 550 (1957).
41 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
42 Id. at 545.
'1 See id. at 549-50 (limiting the holding). But see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying
text (Justices Frankfurter and Jackson criticized Court for deciding issue without ruling
on other possible claims).
" Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 551-52, 555-56 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
Id. at 560 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 563 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson declared:
While [the court] may evade [the issue of priority of various states' claims] for
a time, the competition and conflict between states for "escheats" will force us
to some lawyerlike definition of state power over [intangible personalty]. It is
naive beyond even requirements of the judicial office to assume that this lately
manifest concern of the states over abandoned insurance proceeds reflects only
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Not long after Connecticut Mutual, the Supreme Court was faced with
New Jersey's claim against Standard Oil for unclaimed dividends and reis-
suance in the name of New Jersey of the outstanding stock that generated
those dividends. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey"' brought to fruition Justice
Jackson's prophecy. New Jersey, the state of corporate domicile, rather
than claiming custody, sought to escheat the property of missing owners
who did not reside in New Jersey. According to company records, the
last known addresses of the missing owners were in other states and in
a foreign country. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld New Jersey's
right to escheat. 8 The United States Supreme Court sustained New
Jersey's claim, and rejected Standard Oil's due process defense of poten-
tial multiple liability. The Standard Oil Court stated that the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution protected Standard
Oil by requiring other courts to recognize the New Jersey judgment.4 9
Although the New Jersey statute provided for an escheat, the majority
pointed out that any claims of other states were not before the Court.5
That reasoning did not persuade the entire Court. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
joined by Mr. Justice Jackson in dissent, complained that "[t]he Constitu-
tion ought not to be placed in an unseemly light by suggesting that the
constitutional rights of the several States depend on, and are terminated
by, a race of diligence."
5'
The Supreme Court produced a confusing state of the law which al-
lowed the state of residence of the creditor to claim unclaimed property
under the authority of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore.2
Additionally, the state of the holder's domicile could escheat according
to Standard Oil.' Standard Oil further held that for more than one state
to escheat the same property denied the holder due process. This latter
solicitude for the unknown claimants.... [Eischeat of these interests is a newly
exploited, if not newly discovered, source of state revenue .... [W]e should use
[caution and precision] in sustaining one state's claim, lest we be foreclosing other
better-founded ones. This competition and conflict between states already require
us, in all fairness to them, to define the basis on which a state may escheat.
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
47 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
41 State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565, 579 (1950), a ffid sub nom. Standard
Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
41 Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951). "The debts ... having
been taken from [Standard Oil] by a valid judgment of New Jersey ... cannot be taken
by another state. The Full Faith and Credit Clause bars any such double escheat" Id.
I Id. "The claim of no other state to this property is before us and, of course, deter-
mination of any right of a claimant state against New Jersey for the property escheated
by New Jersey must await.presentation here." Id.
5' Id. at 444 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 548, 549 (1948); see supra notes
41-46 and accompanying text (discussing Connecticut Mutual). In Standard Oil, Justices Black,
Frankfurter, Douglas and Jackson dissented because the Court left open the possibility
that the state of residence of the creditor could escheat the property under Connecticut
Mutual. See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428,444 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 445 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
I Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 442 (1951).
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aspect of the holding, together with seemingly inconsistent decisions,
created among the states a race of diligence to escheat.
Against this backdrop of potential multiple liability, the 1954 Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act was written.' The 1954 Act
generally followed the contacts analysis articulated in Connecticut Mutual
and Standard Oil, providing two bases for claiming property.55 Unclaimed
property would be subject to the claim of an enacting state if the holder
was domiciled in the state or if the last known address of the owner was
in the state and the holder did business there.' The 1954 Act, therefore,
made the right to assert a claim of sovereignty depend on the ability of
the state to subject the debtor to suit in its courts. The thrust of the
contacts test generally was to bestow rights to unclaimed property on
at least two states that could subject the holder to service of process.
Consider, for instance, unclaimed dividend payments. The 1954 Act
provided that the state of corporate domicile could assert custody to
unclaimed dividends. 7 The state of the owner's last known address,
however, also could assert custody to unclaimed dividends payable by a
foreign corporation, provided the corporation did business in that state.'
In recognition of the potential for conflict among states enacting the legisla-
tion, the 1954 Act contained a reciprocity clause. 9 The reciprocity clause
favored the state of last known address, but its operation depended on
that state's ability to subject the holder to jurisdiction in its courts and
See Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act prefatory note, at 1-5 (1954).
See id. SS 2, 3(a), 5, 10. Although the Uniform Act did not explicitly so state, the
contacts analysis provided the basis for gaining custody of unclaimed intangible personalty
under the 1954 Act. See id. With the exception of S 3(a) insurance companies, S 4 public
utilities, S 8 state courts, the 1954 Act relied on contacts between the holder and the claim-
ant state to grant custody. See, e.g., id. S§ 2, 5, 10.
' See, e.g., id. § 2. Section 2 of the Uniform Act concerns the disposition of unclaimed
property held by banking and financial institutions. Id. To establish a claim over intangible
property, the state must be the one in which the owner made the deposit, id. S 2(a), or paid
for shares of the bank or financial institution, id. 5 2(b). Other requirements show an even
more direct connection between the holder bank and the claimant state. Under S 2(c), a
state could claim the sum represented by checks certified in the state. Id. S 2(c). Because
state banks operated solely intrastate, only the state of corporate domicile could claim cer-
tified checks. Finally, under § 2(d) a state could claim property removed from safe deposit
boxes within the state. Id. § 2(d). Again, only the state of corporate domicile could claim
under § 2(d) against state binks. Id. S 2(d).
'T Id. 5 5(a).
Id. 5 5(b).
Id. 5 10. Section 10 provided a means of differentiating between the priority of claims:
If specific property [subject to certain enumerated 1954 Act provisions] is held
for or owed or distributable to an owner whose last known address is in another
state by a holder who is subjected to the jurisdiction of that state, the specific
property [is payable to that other state] if:
(a) It may be claimed as abandoned or escheated under the laws of such other
state; and
(b) The laws of such other states make reciprocal provision [as, for example,
is contained in this section.]
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on the enactment of legislation by that state foregoing its claims in
reciprocal circumstances."
The 1954 Act was widely but by no means universally adopted. 1 Con-
flicts between states continued and the states viewed the earlier Supreme
Court decisions as an invitation to a race of diligence. Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania brought a halt to the race.62 In Western
Union, Pennsylvania sought to escheat unclaimed money orders purchased
in Pennsylvania from Western Union, a New York corporation, for
transmittal to payees primarily in states other than Pennsylvania. Western
Union opposed the action on the ground that the Pennsylvania escheat
judgment would not protect the company from multiple liability to the
unpaid owners either in Pennsylvania or in other states.6 Western Union
also argued that the Pennsylvania judgment would not bind other states
that might seek to escheat the same property." In fact, New York had
already taken a portion of the property originally claimed by
0 See id. Not all property was subject to the reciprocity clause. See supra note 56.
Curiously, the 1954 Act made no provision for an enacting state, also the state of last known
address, to reclaim property from the state of corporate domicile when the state of cor-
porate domicile had obtained the property, even though the state of last known address
could not obtain jurisdiction over the holder in its own courts.
"i See Unifom Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 8 U.L.A. 63 (Supp. 1982). Ten
states currently have a version of the 1954 Act in force. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. SS 44-351
to 44-378 (1967 & Supp. 1982) (enacted in 1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 717.01 to 717.30 (1969
& Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1961); Mb. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 17-101 to 17-324 (1975 & Supp.
1981) (enacted in 1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 471-A:1 to 471-A:28 (1968 & Supp. 1977)
(enacted in 1966); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 98.302 to 98.436 (1977) (enacted in 1957); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 7844-1 to 7844-28 (1977) (enacted in 1957); VT. STAT. ANN. title 27, §§ 12084237 (1975 &
Supp. 1978) (enacted in 1965); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-210.1 to 55-210.29 (1981) (enacted in 1961);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.28.070 to 63.28.920 (1966 & Supp. 1980) (enacted in 1955); W. VA.
CODE §§ 36-84 to 36-8-31 (1982) (enacted in 1967). Twenty-one states have enacted the 1966
Act which revised and updated the 1954 Act. See ALA. CODE § 3542-20 to 35-12-48 (1977
& Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. S 50-620 to 50-647 (Supp. 1981) (enacted
in 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-2001 to 85-2031 (1978 & Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1972); HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 523-1 to 523-30 (1976 & Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 141,
§5 101-130 (Smith-Hurd 1964 & Supp. 1980) (enacted in 1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-9-1-1 to
32-9-1-45 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1967); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 556.1 to 556.29
(West 1967 & Supp. 1980) (enacted in 196M) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:151to 9:182 (West Supp.
1981) (enacted in 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. title 33, §§ 1301-1365 (Supp. 1981) (enacted in
1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 345.31 to 345.60 (West 1972 & Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1969); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 70-9-101to 70-9-316 (1981) (enacted in 1963); NEB. REV. STAT. S 694301 to 694329
(1976) (enacted in 1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 120A.010 to 120AA50 (1979) (enacted in 1980);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-8-1 to 7-8-34 (Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1959); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-30-01
to 47-30-28 (1978 & Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. title 60, §S 651-686 (West
1971 & Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS SS 33-21-11 to 33-21-40 (1970 & Supp.
1981) (enacted in 1968); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-17-10 to 2747-360 (Law Co-op. 1977) (enacted
in 1971); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 43-41A-1 to 43-41A-52 (Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1978); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 64-2901 to 64-2932 (Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 177.01 to
177.30 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1970).
" Commonwealth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 400 Pa. 337, 33940, 162 A.2d 617, 621
(1960), rev'd sub nom. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 73 (1961).
I& at 74.
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Pennsylvania. 5 No question of the reportability of the property was before
the Court since Western Union had abandoned any claim to it.
The Supreme Court did not consider Western Union's argument of
potential multiple liability to individual claimants, and instead focused on
the power of Pennsylvania to render a judgment that would bar multiple
escheat. Since neither New York nor any other state besides Pennsylvania
was a party to the Pennsylvania judgment, Pennsylvania could not pro-
tect Western Union from a claim by other states.' The Court reversed
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, denying escheat. Distinguishing Stand-
ard Oil, the Western Union Court returned to the language of Standard
Oil to point out that "[t]he claim of no other state to this property [was]
before [the Standard Oil Court] and, of course, determination of any right
of a claimant state against New Jersey for the property escheated by
New Jersey must await presentation here."67 The Western Union Court
further noted that Standard Oil did not present a real controversy be-
tween States over the right to escheat part or all of the proceeds.68
Although the contacts test in Standard Oil was sufficient to resolve claims
between one state and a holder, the test was unworkable to resolve
disputes among various states claiming from one holder. Western Union
therefore, signaled the Court's intention to finally resolve the problems
created by a contacts analysis.
The Western Union Court noted the problem of rapidly multiplying
unclaimed property laws covering a broad range of intangible transac-
tions which produced inevitable conficts between states and invited states
to present conflicting claims to the Supreme Court as a forum for final
and authoritative determination.69 Western Union forced any state facing
an actual dispute by a sister state to bring an original action in the
Supreme Court for a declaration of its rights before it could take the prop-
erty. At the time the Court decided Western Union, fewer than ten states
had adopted the 1954 Act with its full reciprocity provision.
IV. TEXAS V. NEW JERSEY
Shortly after the Western Union decision, Texas invoked the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and brought an action against New
Jersey and Pennsylvania to seek a declaration of Texas' right to escheat
8 Id. at 74, 76. New York was not a party in the Western Union litigation. Id. at 75.
New York filed an amicus curiae brief. Id at 71.
Id. at 75.
"' Id. at 76 (distinguishing Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 443 (1951)).
8 Id.
" Id. at 76-77. The Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in ac-
tions between states. U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2. Mr. Justice Frankfurter had recognized this
jurisdictional grant in Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore. 333 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 78
(1961) (recognizing that Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in controversies between states
was urged by dissent in Connecticut Mutual).
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property held by Sun Oil Company." The Court in Texas v. New Jersey
had to decide which of the contending states' claims to sovereignty was
superior.7 At least four states asserted the right to escheat or to take
custody of debts owed by Sun and left unclaimed by creditors. Four rules
were proposed. First, Texas urged that the funds should go to the state
having the most significant contacts with the debt.72 Sun Oil had two of-
fices in Texas and did a great deal of business there. Many of Sun Oil's
creditors resided in Texas. Second, New Jersey, Sun Oil's state of cor-
porate domicile, argued that the funds should go to the state of the debtor
company's incorporation.7 Third, Pennsylvania argued that the debtor
should pay the unclaimed funds to the state in which the company had
its principal place of business.74 Finally, Florida, an intervenor in the litiga-
tion, argued that the funds should be paid to the state of the creditor's
last known address. 75 Each of the claimant states contended that its con-
tacts with the obligation were superior to those of rival claimants.
The Texas Court rejected the contacts analysis as being "not really
any workable test at all." The question was not whether the various claims
were legitimate, but rather which of several legitimate claims was superior.
The Texas Court adopted a system of priorities based on the principle
that unclaimed property belongs to the creditor and, therefore, should
be payable to the creditor's state of residence.7' For ease of administra-
tion, the Court defined the creditor's state of residence to be the state
of the owner's last known address as shown on the debtor's records. Since
no applicable federal statute existed, the Court explained its role as that
of an arbitrator of interstate disputes and announced that it was "not
controlled by statutory or constitutional processes or by past decisions"77
but by "principles of fairness"78 and "ease of administration. ' 79 The princi-
ple of fairness was to distribute escheats among states in the proportion
to the commercial activities of the residents. The principle is a variation
of the common-law doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam.8 0
To provide a comprehensive scheme and to resolve interstate disputes,
the Supreme Court provided that the state of the debtor's domicile could
70 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 675 (1965).
"' See id. at 677. The Texas Court stated that it is the responsibility of the courts to
formulate a rule settling the question concerning which state may escheat intangible prop-
erty. Id.
7 Id. at 678.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
75 Id. at 680-81.
7' Id. at 681-82.
Id. at 683.
78 Id. at 680.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 680 n.10, 681. Mobilia sequuntur personam, literally translated says that movables
follow the law of the person. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (5th ed. 1979). The term means
"that intangible personalty has [its] situs at the domicile of its owner:' Blodgett v. Silber-
man, 277 U.S. 1, 10 (1928). The Supreme Court called Tnobilia sequuntur personam a well-
settled rule of law. Id.
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take custody if either the state of the owner's last known address did
not provide for escheat or the owner had no recorded address.8 This pro-
vision prevented a windfall to the holder and assured that unclaimed prop-
erty benefitted the state's citizenry.' The claim of the state of the holder's
domicile would yield, however, if another state later proved that the last
known address of the creditor was within its borders or if the creditor's
state subsequently adopted abandoned property legislation.' The Court
thought it had enunciated a clear rule governing intangible obligations
and providing a definite reference point for all the states.'
Not long after Texas v. New Jersey, the Court in Pennsylvania v. New
York' 5 was asked to extend its principle of fairness distributing escheats
among the states. Plaintiffs requested that the state in which Western
Union money orders were purchased prevail over the claim of New York,
the state of domicile of the holder. Pennsylvania urged that the state of
purchase should be presumed to be the state of the sender's residence."'
The Court declined to indulge that presumption and instead adhered to
the Texas rule permitting a first priority claim only if the owner's actual
last known addresses existed, giving preference to the ease of administra-
tion principle.
Both Texas and Pennsylvania are beguiling in their simplicity and
definitiveness and were intended to resolve the question reserved in
Western Union concerning which state has the right to claim when con-
flicting state claims exist. Unfortunately, some genuine confusion about
the meaning of the Texas decision has occurred. The rules enunciated in
Texas substantially undermine the bases for claims of sovereignty made
in many existing unclaimed property statutes, including the 1954 Uniform
Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.
Since much of the analysis of the 1981 Act depends on a proper
understanding of Texas v. New Jersey, it is important to clarify the limits
of that decision. The decision provides a rule of priorities that may be
stated quite simply:
When two or more states, exercising valid claims of sovereign power
to take custody of abandoned property assert conflicting claims to
the same property, priority shall be given to the state of the creditor.
The additional rules enunciated in Texas are designed to ensure that this
81 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 (1965). The Tezas Court sought to prevent
a windfall to the holder, or to assure that unclaimed property "is used for the general good
rather than for the chance enrichment of particular individuals or organizations." Id; see
Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 (1951).
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
" Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 (1965).
Cf. id. at 678 (criticizing Texas' basis for its claim because of lack of clarity and
ease of administration).
407 U.S. 206 (1972).
Id. at 212.
87 Id; see Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965) (ease of administration principle).
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basic resolution of the priority question is carried out. Texas does not limit
the power of a state to enact legislation encompassing a broad array of
unclaimed property. A state may claim the right to assert custody to aban-
doned property regardless of the residence of either the creditor or the
debtor. For instance, claims based on the situs of the transaction or on
the principal place of business of the holder are not impermissible.' Texas
v. New Jersey does not require that a state be able to subject a holder
to process in its own courts before the state may exercise previously
legislated powers of sovereignty to claim abandoned property. In short,
the Texas Court merely provided a mechanism for the resolution of valid
but conflicting claims to the same property and awarded priority to the
state of the creditor.
Unfortunately, commentators, courts, holders, and on occasion, state
unclaimed property administrators have confused the issues of jurisdic-
tion, both subject matter and personal, with the issues of sovereignty.
Holders have argued, for instance, that Texas v. New Jersey limits the
power to claim abandoned property to two states, the state of last known
address of the creditor and the state of corporate domicile, with the state
of corporate domicile having no power to claim if there is a state of last
known address with an applicable unclaimed property law. Others have
decried the Court's rejection of its previously used contacts analysis, claim-
ing that without some minimum contacts between the claimant state and
the holder, a state is without jurisdiction over the holder and cannot en-
force its claim. 9 Both arguments are misplaced. The first argument incor-
rectly presumes that states cannot exercise the power to legislate, or
sovereignty, in conflict with competing state claims. The second argument
confuses sovereignty with jurisdiction, or the ability of a state to use its
courts to reach a person holding property.
Escheat is an exercise of sovereignty.9" Under the ancient doctrine
of bona vacantia, when one died without blood relations, his property
passed to the Crown, subject to the rights of the widow.9" The Crown
held personal property not as an ultimate owner but as one with a greater
equitable claim than that of a stranger.9" Recognizing the principle of bona
vacantia, the Supreme Court on several occasions has viewed unclaimed
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. O'Connor, 488 Pa. 340, 412 A.2d 539 (1980) (basis for
claim situs of the transaction); Depository Institutions-Insurance Act Pub. L. No. 93-495,
§§ 603-604, 88 Stat. 1525-26 (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (1976)) (permitting
state of principal place of business to assert claim to money orders and traveler's checks
when state of last known address of purchaser is unknown or that state has no applicable
abandoned property law.)
" See Last Known Address, infra note 126, at 570-77.
' Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 435-36 (1951). "As a broad principle
of jurisprudence rather than as a result of the evolution of legal rules, it is clear that a
state, subject to constitutional limitations, may use its legislative power to dispose of prop-
erty within its reach, belonging to unknown persons." Id.
01 See Escheat, supra note 3, at 1326-27 n.4.
See Escheat, supra note 3, at 1326-27.
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property laws as conservation statutes with the state acting in its
sovereign capacity as a conservator of its vanished residents' property. 3
In numerous prior decisions dating back to 1911, the Supreme Court
has analyzed exhaustively the question of state sovereignty over aban-
doned property. In Provident Institution for Savings v. Malone," the Court
provided an extensive analysis of sovereignty based on the right of a state
to act as a conservator or administrator of a missing person's estate. Com-
menting on the Massachusetts statute, the Court said that the statute was
like other legislation providing for the appointment of custodians for an
absentee citizen's real and personal property.'5 Just as a state can legislate
to determine the right to descent and distribution of property, the state
can legislate to determine the succession to property belonging to its
missing residents. As the Court concluded in Malone, such legislative power
is undoubted.
Problems arise in our federal system because fifty sovereigns exist
and all but two have unclaimed property laws. When claims of states in-
terfere with each other, the Supreme Court must resolve those disputes.
In none of the intangible escheat cases beginning with Connecticut Mutual'
and continuing through Standard Oil," Western Union,99 Texas v. New
Jersey,"° and Pennsylvania v. New York,"1 however, did the Supreme Court
deny a state's claim on grounds of lack of sovereignty. Even in Western
Union the Court rejected Pennsylvania's claim not because the state's
assertion of sovereignty was too broad, but because Pennsylvania courts
could not protect Western Union from the legitimate claims to the same
property by other states.
An unfortunate choice of language in Texas v. New Jersey caused some
confusion about the meaning of the decision. Justice Black, writing for
the majority, initially characterized the issue before the Court as "...
a controversy as to which State has jurisdiction to take title to certain
abandoned intangible personal property through escheat ....""' Later
in the opinion, the Court said that the property was subject to escheat
only by the State of the creditor's last known address."3 Many holders
See, e.g., Provident Inst. for Sav. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 347 U.S. 428
(1951). The Court in Connecticut Mutual described the state as a conservator when claiming
property under a custodial unclaimed property law. 333 U.S. at 546-47. In Standard Oil,
the Court characterized Moore as involving a conservation statute. 347 U.S. at 437.
9 221 U.S. 660 (1911).
05 Id. at 663.
Id. at 666.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
" Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
10 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
101 Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972).
10 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 675 (1965) (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 681-82 (emphasis added).
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have assumed that the use of the term "escheat" was generic, by including
custodial taking as well as traditional escheat. The holders have suggested
further that the Court prescribed a requirement of subject matter jurisdic-
tion outlining the only possible claims of sovereignty.
Considering the particular context in which the Court used the term,
however, the Texas Court clearly was speaking of escheat in the formal
sense. The Court did not prohibit a custodial taking when a state had
exercised its legislative powers, since the state of the creditor's last known
address can reclaim the property later."' Only the first priority claimant,
the state of last known address, finally can escheat the property and
therefore, actually vest title in itself and place the property in repose.
While other states might cut off the rights of private parties, no other
state can cut off the right of the state of last known address to reclaim
the property. The Texas Court remarked that the power to claim aban-
doned property is a state legislative function, as is jurisdiction, and need
not be exclusive.' 5 In other words, several states may claim the same
abandoned property. If a dispute actually arises, the Supreme Court as
the ultimate arbitrator of disputes between the states, must resolve the
various claims.
The foregoing analysis rationalizes what has been viewed by many
as an inconsistent line of cases preceding Texas v. New Jersey. In Connec-
ticut Mutual, the state of domicile of the insured was allowed to claim
the property because otherwise "the insurance companies would retain
moneys contracted to be paid on condition and which normally they would
have been required to pay."'0 8 Although the state of domicile of the holder
was entitled to escheat in Standard Oil, the Court noted that property
subject to escheat escapes seizure by inferior claimants "and is used for
the general good rather than for the chance enrichment of particular in-
dividuals or organizations."'0 7 In effect, the Supreme Court in Connecticut
Mutual and Standard Oil did not allow issues concerning which state might
become the ultimate beneficiary of the funds to interfere with the pro-
cess of placing the funds in the custody of some state."8 Texas v. New
Jersey merely concluded the process. Texas established the rules to sort
out abandoned property among the states.
In some state court cases holders have urged that Texas v. New Jersey
limits claims to two states: the state of the owner's last known address
and the state of the holder's domicile. Arguably, the state of the holder's
domicile may take only if no record of the owner's address exists or if
See Texas v. New Jersey, 380 U.S. 518 (1965) (clarified in final decree entered by Court).
,o5 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 678 n.8 (1965).
10 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
10, Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 (1951).
,' See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 n.13 (1965). In Texas v. New Jersey, the
Court noted that "none of this Court's cases allowing States to escheat intangible property
decided the possible effect of conflicting claims of other States." I&
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the last known address state has no applicable escheat legislation. The
Texas analysis also suggests that the failure of either the state of last
known address or the state of corporate domicile to make a claim results
in ultimate retention of the property by the holder, since no other state
is empowered to claim the property.
Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court faced the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction in Sperry & Hutchinson v. O'Connor."9 In Sperry &
Hutchinson, the Escheator of Pennsylvania filed a petition to escheat
unclaimed trading stamps issued by Sperry & Hutchinson (S&H), a New
Jersey corporation, to Pennsylvania retail establishments for ultimate
distribution to customers of those retailers. Since no one kept records
of the owners' last known addresses, no state could take as a first prior-
ity claimant."' The state of corporate domicile is the second priority claim-
ant. Pennsylvania argued that New Jersey, the state of corporate domicile,
could not escheat trading stamps under New Jersey law."' The Penn-
sylvania Escheator asserted that Texas v. New Jersey simply established
a rule of priority and that claims based on other grounds were not pro-
hibited. Pennsylvania claimed that it had greater contacts with the debt
than anyone else and that equity demanded payment of the money to Penn-
sylvania where the money would benefit the residents of the state of pur-
chase rather than leave a windfall with the corporate holder.
S&H filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
claiming that Texas v. New Jersey constituted a complete bar to Penn-
sylvania's claim."' S&H maintained that Pennsylvania had no power to
claim the unredeemed stamps and hence could not confer power on its
courts to hear and decide the claim. "' S&H also argued that Texas v. New
Jersey established that only the state of the owner's last known address
or the state of corporate domicile could claim the property. Under S&H's
analysis of Texas v. New Jersey, any order entered in favor of Pennsylvania
would be void, and the decision would not be entitled to full faith and
credit. S&H maintained that if it had to pay Pennsylvania, other claimants
could subject S&H to multiple liability, thus violating the due process
clause. Specifically, S&H denied that a decision in favor of Pennsylvania
would foreclose New Jersey from claiming the same property."
4
The trial court denied S&H's motion to dismiss and the commonwealth
court affirmed."' On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
1" Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. O'Connor, 488 Pa. 340, 412 A.2d 539 (1980), affg, 32 Pa.
Commw. 599, 379 A.2d 1378 (1977).
"' Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. O'Connor, 488 Pa. 340, 342, 412 A.2d 539, 541 (1980).
. Id. at 342, 412 A.2d at 541 & n.4 (New Jersey's right to escheat trading stamps
denied in New Jersey v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 56 N.J. Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (1959),
aff'd per curiam, 31 N.J. 385, 157 A.2d 505 (1960)).
Il2 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. O'Conner, 488 Pa. 340, 341, 412 A.2d 539, 540 (1980).
,,' Id. at 341-42, 412 A.2d at 54041.
114 Id. at 343, 412 A.2d at 542.
"I O'Connor v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 32 Pa. Commw. 599,
379 A.2d 1378 (1977), affjd, 488 Pa. 340, 412 A.2d 539 (1980).
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the trial court, holding that Pennsylvania had jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case."6 The validity of Pennsylvania's claim was to be deter-
mined by the scope of its legislation. The issue was whether the Penn-
sylvania statute encompassed the property in conflict. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declined to decide the due process issue raised by S&H
regarding possible multiple liability. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
however, noted that the Pennsylvania statute would provide indemnifica-
tion to S&H, seemingly foreclosing any argument of potential multiple
liability.117
In a second case interpreting Texas v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court
of Texas clearly rejected a jurisdictional interpretation and distinguished
Texas as involving a direct controversy between states over unclaimed
property."' State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co."' in-
volved a controversy between Texas and the trustees of a long defunct
corporation originally chartered in New Mexico. Trustees domiciled in
Texas held the remaining corporate assets, consisting of unpaid liquidating
dividends.2 The assets belonged to 208 stockholders with addresses in
states other than Texas and in foreign countries. Several of the other
states had applicable unclaimed property laws. Only one missing
stockholder had a last known address in Texas.2 ' The trustees reported
the existence of the property to Texas but denied that Texas had any
right to it, asserting that since the last known addresses of most
shareholders were in states with unclaimed property legislation, only those
states could claim the property under Texas v. New Jersey.'
The Texas Supreme Court held that New Mexico, Republic Petroleum's
state of domicile, could not claim as the domiciliary state since the trustees
elected to conduct the liquidation in Texas and since the corporation had
been dissolved for 24 years." New Mexico could not subject the trustees
to the jurisdiction of its courts. The Liquidating Trustees court permitted
Texas, the state of domicile of the trustees, to assert custody over all
the property, holding that Texas unclaimed property law allowed other
states to come forward later with proof of a superior right to escheat
or to take custody. Unless the court allowed Texas to claim the property,
the court noted the trustees likely would dissipate the property, defeating
... Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. O'Connor, 488 Pa. 340, 412 A.2d 539, 541-42 (1980).
117 Id. at 341, 412 A.2d at 542.
1.8 State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co., 510, S.W.2d 311, 314-15
(Tex. 1974). See Comment, Escheat in Texas: A Current Look at the Intangible Issue, 29 Sw.
L.J. 575, 595-99 (1975) (discussing Liquidating Trustees).





1" Id. at 312-13. In Liquidating Trustees, the trustees had completed liquidation except
for payments to shareholders more than 24 years before Texas sought to escheat the un-
claimed funds. Id. at 312.
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the rights of those claimant states having a superior right to custody.'"
The Liquidating Trustees court, therefore, interpreted Texas v. New Jersey
as allowing the state of Texas to obtain custody of property from the holder
even though the state of last known address had an applicable unclaimed
property law."u
Sperry & Hutchinson and Liquidating Trustees clearly are correct
decisions. The result in each case is salutary, preserving assets for the
common good. Additionally, the decisions are fully consistent with the
priorities of Texas v. New Jersey.
Some commentators have maintained that the Court's rejection of a
contacts test in Texas v. New Jersey was unwise because without some
minimum contact the state of last known address could not sue the
holder." On occasion, holders have raised the defense that unless they
can be served with process, the state is without power to enact legisla-
tion to claim abandoned property in the holder's possession. This is a
mistaken view.
In the earlier cases, Connecticut Mutual and Standard Oil, the Supreme
Court employed a contacts analysis only as a means of justifying the
legitimacy of a state's claim to abandoned property. In Texas v. New Jersey,
the Supreme Court recognized that the role of the state as the protector
of its vanished citizen's property was another basis for a state's claim
of sovereignty among competing claimant states. The Texas Court deemed
the state's role as protector superior to a state's claim based on corporate
domicile. The Texas Court expressly noted that the issues did not involve
any questions of state sovereignty. As the Supreme Court enunciated in
Texas, unclaimed property is an asset of the creditor and not of the
debtor." The relationship of a sovereign to its citizenry does not depend
on contacts with the debtor.
Even if a state lacks sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdic-
tion, and, therefore the power to use its own courts to subject the holder
124 Id. at 315.
12 Id. at 313-14.
See Note, Escheat of Corporate Intangibles: Will the State of the Stockholder's Last
Known Address Be Able to Enforce Its Right?, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 559, 570-77 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Last Known Address]; Escheat of Intangibles, supra note 24, at 556,
558 nn. 49 & 51; Comment, Escheat - Abandoned Intangible Property - State of Last Known
Address of Creditor Given Exclusive Right - Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965), 33
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 979,983 (1965). Effective enforcement of unclaimed property laws requires
that the state seeking to enforce be aware of the existence of the property and be able
to subject the noncomplying holder to some court's jurisdiction. See Last Known Address,
supra, at 568. See also, Escheat oflntangibles, supra note 24, at 556 (1966). The note, Escheat
of Intangibles, in general refers to "... legal arguments which cogently question the right
of the state of creditors last known address to escheat intangibles, ... " without spelling
these arguments out in detail. Id. The note does urge that the Court's action was misdirected.
Id.
'" Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 680 (1965); see supra note 80 (mobilia sequuntur
personam).
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to suit, the state nonetheless may enact legislation to determine its
residents' rights to intangible property. The contacts analysis has no bear-
ing on the issue of the power of a state to legislate succession. As in the
case of decedents' estates, if the state of the decedent cannot subject a
debtor to process in its courts, ancillary administrative proceedings must
be initiated against the debtor when the state can serve the debtor with
process. The fact that a state cannot use its own courts to protect prop-
erty belonging to its residents does not vitiate the authority of the state's
legislation to determine the succession to intangible property.
State v. Amsted Industries" is illustrative and provides a resolution
to the apparent contradiction that is entirely consistent with Texas v. New
Jersey. In Amsted Industries, the State of New Jersey sought to escheat
unclaimed dividends, wages and other property held by Amsted, a cor-
poration domiciled in New Jersey. The three classes of owners present
were New Jersey residents, persons with last known addresses in states
without applicable escheat legislation, and persons with last known ad-
dress in states with applicable escheat legislation that could not subject
Amsted to the jurisdiction of their courts. New Jersey sought to claim
all of the property, arguing that unless a state could subject the holder
to process, the state had no effective unclaimed property legislation. The
New Jersey court denied its state's claim to the property belonging to
persons with last known addresses in states that had unclaimed property
legislation but that could not serve Amsted with process in their courts.
The court pointed out that New Jersey must yield in its claim to this
property since other states could always come into New Jersey and use
the New Jersey courts to enforce their unclaimed property laws.
Obviously, contacts between the holder and the state of last known
address are important for effective administration of an unclaimed prop-
erty program, a matter considered in Section IV. Nevertheless, the con-
tacts test raises an entirely different question and is not a problem of
sovereignty. The state, therefore, acts as conservator of property belong-
ing to its residents and that relationship has priority over a competing
claim to the property based solely on a relationship between the debtor
and his state of domicile. The Texas v. New Jersey Court was not called
upon to consider how the conservator state could enforce power over
unclaimed property when the conservator state's only contact with the
debtor was the debtor's record of the creditor's last known address in
the conservator state.'
, 48 N.J. 544, 226 A.2d 715 (1967). See State v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank and Trust
Co., 117 N.J. Super. 38, 283 A.2d 543 (1971), modified on other grounds, 62 N.J. 50, 298 A.2d 65
(1972); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kervick, 60 N.J. 289, 288 A.2d 289 (1972).
'" See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965). In Texas, the Court was not required
to face the issues of reporting and amenability to suit. The litigants neither briefed nor
argued those issues to the special master or to the Court itself for several reasons. First,
Sun was apparently amenable to suit in each state claiming the property. Second, the par-
ties exercising the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only called on that body to
resolve an interstate dispute to specific property. Third, the Court could not have resolved
the problem even if it had wanted to.
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Accordingly, Texas v. New Jersey rendered the 1954 Act inadequate
because in large part, the 1954 Act based its assertion of sovereignty on
the claimant state's ability to subject the holder to the jurisdiction of its
courts.' 0 Facing the rival claim of another state, Texas v. New Jersey might
bar a state under the 1954 Act from claiming certain property held by
persons subject to the state's jurisdiction, even though the 1954 Act would
permit the claim. Texas v. New Jersey, however, would not prevent the
state, as did the 1954 Act, from asserting custody to property held by
persons not subject to the state's jurisdiction.
A simple hypothetical illustrates the impact of the rule of Texas v.
New Jersey on the 1954 Act. Assume that a corporate holder, incorporated
in State A, holds unclaimed property, or the corporation's obligation to
its shareholder represented by an uncashed dividend check, belonging to
a creditor whose last known address is in State B. The holder did not
do business in State B. Under Texas v. New Jersey, State B's claim has
first priority. Since the holder did not do business in B, however, the 1954
Act would not authorize State B to assert a claim to the property, or to
recover from another state under the 1954 Act's reciprocity provision.'31
State A, if it had enacted the 1954 Act, could claim the property under
state law in accordance with the second priority rule of Texas v. New Jersey.
Allowing A to recover, however, would frustrate the goal of equitable
distribution of unclaimed property among creditor states and would ef-
fectively destroy the concept of the state acting as conservator of the
property of its unlocated residents. The contacts requirement of the 1954
Act limited state sovereignty over intangibles, making it unnecessary to
provide for possible claims by states having no power over the debtor,
a matter discussed in Section IV of this article.
The Texas Court partially answered the ringing dissent of Justice
Jackson in Connecticut mutual, stating:
While we may evade it for a time, the competition and con-
flict between states for "escheats" will force us to some lawyerlike
definition of state power over this subject.
3 2
The Texas Court gave a lawyerlike answer to the major problems of
the priority and enforcement puzzle. The Court, however, also recognized
its own institutional limitations, which foreclosed a complete solution and
called for ultimate resolution by the states themselves." This article now
turns to a resolution of those matters not considered by the Court in Texas.
' See Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act S 10 (1954) (requiring state to
have jurisdiction over holder to assert custody).
31 See id. S 10.
"3 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 563 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
1 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965). "We believe that the rule we adopt
is the fairest, is easy to apply and in the long run will be the most generally acceptable to
all the States." Id. (emphasis added)
[Vol. 40:1429
UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT
V. THE 1981 UNIFORM ACT
One of the drafters' major goals for the 1981 Act was to make the
Act's basic thrust of sovereignty consistent with Texas v. New Jersey.1
A second goal was to provide an effective means to insure that states
could enforce the broadened claims of sovereignty. Several collateral issues
bearing on the ease of enforcement goal do not have simple solutions.
For example, under the first priority of Texas v. New Jersey, the holder.
must turn over unclaimed property to the state of the owner's last known
address. That priority is meaningful only if the holder keeps some record
of last known addresses. For a large percentage of abandoned property,
however, holders have destroyed or never have obtained address records.1"
Since a state must rely on the holder to report the existence of property,
the claiming state cannot know of or enforce its claim absent contacts
with the holder sufficient to compel reporting. The remainder of this arti-
cle addresses the statutory resolution of the Act's major objectives to
provide rights of sovereignty consistent with Texas v. New Jersey, and
to insure a state's ability to exercise that sovereignty.
A. The Claims of Sovereignty
The propositions that unclaimed property remains an asset of the
vanished owner and that the state of last known address of that owner
has a paramount right to assert custody to the property underlie all the
priority rules of the 1981 Act." Additionally, the Act is structured to
eliminate competing claims of sovereignty among states. The Act also
minimizes, if not eliminates, any need for a race of diligence among the
states.
Section 3 of the 1981 Act is the key section for assertion of sover-
eignty by a state. Section 3 provides a statutory system of priority incor-
porating the holding in Texas v. New Jersey.3 ' The state with first prior-
13 See Uniform Unclaimed Property Act prefatory note, at i (1981).
' See infra note 148. Unclaimed property administrators estimate that holders have
no owner's address for more than 50% of the value of unclaimed property reported to the
states. Id.
" Uniform Unclaimed Property Act S 3, comment (1981)
3 Id. § 3. Section 3 provides that:
Unless otherwise provided in this Act or by other statute of this State, in-
tangible property is subject to the custody of this State as unclaimed property
if the conditions raising a presumption of abandonment under Sections 2 and 5
through 16 are satisfied, and:
(1) the last known address, as shown on the records of the holder, of the ap-
parent owner is in this State;
(2) the records of the holder do not reflect the identity of the person entitled
to the property and it is established that the last known address of the person
entitled to the property is in this State;
(3) the records of the holder do not reflect the last known address of the
apparent owner, and it is established that:
(i) the last known address of the person entitled to the property is in
this State, or
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ity is the state of the last known address of the owner asserting custody
over unclaimed intangible property. 13 If there is no last known address
or if the state of last known address does not have applicable abandoned
property legislation, the state of the holder's domicile may claim.
13 9 If
neither the state of last known address nor the state of domicile of the
holder can assert a valid claim, section 3 provides that the state in which
the transaction creating the property right occurred may claim."' Section
3 was drafted narrowly to avoid competing claims to the same property.
(ii) the holder is a domiciliary or a government or governmental subdivi-
sion or agency of this State and has not previously paid or delivered the property
to the state of the last known address of the apparent owner or other person
entitled to the property;
(4) the last known address, as shown on the records of the holder, of the ap-
parent owner is in a state that does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial
taking of the property of its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable
to the property and the holder is a domiciliary or a government or governmental
subdivision or agency of this State;
(5) the last known address, as shown on the records of the holder, of the ap-
parent owner is in a foreign nation and the holder is a domiciliary or a govern-
ment or governmental subdivision or agency of this State; or
(6) the transaction out of which the property arose occurred in this State, and
(i)(A) the last known address of the apparent owner or other person en-
titled to the property is unknown, or
(B) the last known address of the apparent owner or other person en-
titled to the property is in a state that does not provide by law for the escheat
or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law is
not applicable to the property, and
(ii) the holder is a domiciliary of a state that does not provide by law
for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed
property law is not applicable to the property.
Id.
The general scheme of priority for asserting claims to abandoned property is found
in S 3. Id. However, a special provision for asserting custody over unclaimed travelers checks
and money orders is present in SS 4(d) and (e). The special rules in S 4(d) and (e) generally
provide that the state of purchase shall have first priority with a second priority for the
state of principal place of business of the issuer. Id. SS 4(d), (e). This scheme of priority
was authorized by Congress. See Pub. L. No. 93-495, SS 603,604,88 Stat. 1500,1525-26 (1974)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. SS 2501 et seq. (1976)). The congressional action was taken in response
to the Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania v. New York. 407 U.S. 206 (1972). In Penn-
sylvania v. New York, Pennsylvania sought to escheat Western Union money orders sold
in Pennsylvania on the basis that the state of purchase could be presumed to be the state
of last known address for purposes of the priority rules of Texas v. New Jersey. The Supreme
Court would not indulge the presumption and held that without last known address infor-
mation, the property was subject to escheat only by the state of corporate domicile. Follow-
ing Pennsylvania, Congress passed Pub. L. No. 93-495 that substituted as the basis for assert-
ing a claim to travelers checks and money orders the state of purchase. Pub. L. No. 93-495,
S§ 603, 604, 88 Stat. 1500, 1525-26 (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2501 et seq. (1976)). The
Uniform Act adopts the authorization permitted by Congress. Further, S 31 of the Act re-
quires that holders of travelers checks and money orders retain records indicating the state
of purchase. Uniform Unclaimed Property Act 5 31 (1981).
1 Uniform Unclaimed Property Act S 3(1) (1981).
13 Id. SS 3(3(ii), 3(4).
140 Id. S 3(6).
[Vol. 40:1429
UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT
Potential claimants can assert custody only when no higher priority claim-
ant seeks custody. For instance, the Act authorizes the state of corporate
domicile to assert a claim to property only if the last known address of
the owner is unknown, 4 or if the state of last known address has not
provided legislation for taking custody of the property.'
Section 25 of the Act provides the mechanism for states with a higher
priority claim to come forward subsequently and reclaim the property
from the state that obtained custody initially.' Section 25 insures that
the first priority claimant will take custody of its property and removes
any incentive for a lower priority state to engage in a race of diligence.
Sections 3(1), (2) and (3)(i) of the Act encompass the first priority claim
of Texas. The holder's records are the most likely place from which to
ascertain the last known address of the owner. The holder, however, may
not have kept complete or accurate records. If the records of the holder
no longer contain the name of the owner but do provide the owner's ad-
dress, the state of the owner's address may claim the property. For ex-
ample, insurance records sometimes show that the insurer made a pay-
ment to a particular address, but the insurer did not retain the name of
the payee. While it would be impossible to reunite the owner with his
property in this circumstance, permitting the state of last known address
to claim the property fulfills the goal of proportional distribution of
escheats according to the commercial activities of the the states'
residents. ' "
Sections 3(3)(ii) and (4) of the Act provide for the claim of the second
priority state established by Texas v. New Jersey.14 5 If the state of last
known address cannot be determined when the property is presumed aban-
doned or if the state of last known address does not have an applicable
unclaimed property law, the 1981 Act authorizes the state of domicile of
the holder to take the property. The initial assertion of custody of the
second priority state remains subject to a later claim by the state of the
owner's last known address, if that state can prove that the address of
the creditor was within its borders or if that state subsequently enacts
an unclaimed property law.
146
Section 3(6) goes beyond the Texas decision, but makes an extension
of sovereignty consistent with Texas. If for any reason the state of the
creditor cannot take, either because no last known address exists or that
state does not have applicable unclaimed property legislation, and the state
of corporate domicile does not have a law applicable to the property, the
state in which the transaction arose can claim. The third priority claim-
ant state holds subject to defeasance under section 25 if either of the first
... Id- § 3(6)(i)0k).
U2 Id. 55 3(4), 3(6}{i}{B).
SId- § 25.
", See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 681 (1965).
Compare Uniform Unclaimed Property Act §§ 3(3)(ii), 3(4) (1981), with Texas v. New
Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 (1965).
... Uniform Unclaimed Property Act § 25(a) (1981).
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two priority states subsequently makes a valid claim to the property. 1 "
In Pennsylvania v. New York, the Supreme Court was faced with rival
claimants, The Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. New York" would not
indulge the presumption that the purchase of Western Union money orders
in a given state was sufficient proof that the last known addresses of the
creditors were within that state. The competing presumption that the
money orders were purchased for use elsewhere was equally plausible.
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania v. New York does not preclude a state's claim,
provided no higher priority claimant seeks custody. The 1981 Act relieves
the holder of liability upon payment to a legitimate claimant and protects
the holder from claims made by any other state or the owner.' Section
3(6) is designed to insure that the chance possessor of unclaimed property
does not become the ultimate beneficiary to the exclusion of all residents
of the claimant state.
B. The Exercise of Rights of Sovereignty
Although the provisions of section 3 go beyond the Court's opinion
in Texas v. New Jersey, few holders should object to the Act's extensions
of sovereignty. If the 1981 Act forces a holder to disgorge a windfall in
favor of a state, the holder cares little what state receives the money.
The holder suffers the loss of a windfall in either instance. Providing for
effective enforcement of the broad principles enunciated in section 3,
however, may cause some genuine anguish among holders. Record keep-
ing and reporting are not without expense. Unclaimed property programs
depend primarily on voluntary compliance. If the cost of compliance ex-
ceeds a certain minimum amount, holders will complain to the legislature
or refuse to comply. The cost of compliance, therefore, remains a para-
mount concern in any attempted solution to the enforcement problem.
Unclaimed property administrators estimate that up to now no last
known addresses for fifty percent or more of all abandoned property have
been reported to the states.1" The 1954 Act did not mandate expressly that
holders retain records of last known addresses, even though the report-
ing provisions presupposed record retention. High costs prohibit detailed
record retention for many kinds of abandoned property such as trading
stamps, scrip, coupons, and small denomination gift certificates. The trans-
actions giving rise to such property simply do not provide a reasonable
opportunity for detailed information gathering.
No state unclaimed property laws intially require that holders obtain
owners' addresses.1" Holders who initially obtain address information often
clear their files after a given number of years for legitimate cost control
147 Id.
14' 407 US. 206 (1972).
..9 Uniform Unclaimed Property Act §§ 20(a), 20(e) (1981).
" See Letter from Lord, supra note 10; Letter from Shanley, supra note 10. See also
supra note 133 and accompanying text (holders lack owners' addresses).
... See, e.g., Uniform Unclaimed Property Act S 31(a) (1981).
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reasons. Whether as a result of legitimate house cleaning or deliberate
evasion, the effect of record destruction remains the same. Record destruc-
tion vitiates the state's ability to reunite owners with their property and
wipes out the first priority claim provided in Texas v. New Jersey.15
The 1981 Act recognizes the impossible burden of a blanket require-
ment that all holders initially obtain last known addresses in every in-
stance. The Act, therefore, does not mandate that holders obtain address
information. Section 31, however, requires that a holder initially obtain-
ing the information must maintain address records for ten years after
the property first becomes reportable as abandoned property, or for any
shorter period the state may provide by rule.1 Section 31 seeks to insure
that holders do not frustrate the last known address priority by destruc-
tion of records that often constitute the only source of information. Sec-
tion 30(e) buttresses the record retention requirement of section 31 by
preventing holders from indiscriminately destroying records and failing
to report abandoned property."' Section 30(e) permits a state to base its
claim on estimates or other available records of reportable property if
the holder fails to maintain required records.
The record retention policies of holders vary greatly. Often holders
have computer codes or other means of identifying the states in which
the claimant resided, but no longer can provide an address sufficient for
mail delivery. Texas v. New Jersey does not clarify whether a computer
code would constitute proof that the creditor's last known address was
within the claimant state.155 The 1981 Act permits a state to rely on other
sources besides the holder's records to prove that the last known address
of the owner of abandoned property was within the state's borders. A
computer code may be sufficient to establish a last known address if the
holder has destroyed the original record." On occasion, states and holders
have negotiated settlements to distribute property to creditor states when
neither party could supply actual last known address information.
No iron clad mechanism exists for a state to assure that the holder
will comply with reporting requirements. Reporting requirements are
crucial to the successful operation of an unclaimed property program.
Although the state has the power to require reports of holders through
legislation, the state's inability to obtain crucial information certainly would
weaken the efficacy of any unclaimed property program. The success of
an unclaimed property program depends more on the state's ability to
obtain reports than on the state's ability to subject a holder to suit in
the state's local courts. Potential legal and administrative difficulties are
present in compelling holders to report.
A distinction exists between "doing business" to sustain service of
'-2 See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 680-82 (1965).
153 Uniform Unclaimed Property Act S 31(a) (1981).
14 Id. § 30(e).
1 See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 (1965).
"'See Uniform Unclaimed Property Act S 3, comment (1981).
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process and "doing business" to sustain a detailed scheme of regulation
by a state.15 For example, a state may be able to subject a foreign cor-
poration to suit and yet be unable to require the same corporation to col-
lect taxes on sales made within the state. Some commentators have urged
that case law makes it exceedingly difficult to compel reporting by
holders."5 In our opinion, however, the "doing business" cases are inap-
posite. Since the state of last known address is entitled to assert by legisla-
tion its claim to succeed to the property of the state's missing residents,
the state is entitled to compel the disclosure of the existence of aban-
doned property. A state may use the courts of a sister state to compel
property turnover if the state has no jurisdictional power over the holder."9
Likewise, the state may use foreign courts to require a holder to report
property belonging to the missing residents.16 A state asserting a claim
to property belonging to its residents is not regulating the affairs of a
corporation in the same way that a state regulates health or safety.
Less populated states have complained that some holders use the
defense of failure to do business as an excuse for not reporting abandoned
property. Nevertheless, most major holders do not rely on this potential
statutory infirmity. Recent experience in states with aggressive unclaimed
property programs has shown that holders seldom interpose failure to
do business as a defense to state claims against them for failing to report
and turn over. More often, the reason holders fail to file is the assump-
tion that individual states with relatively small claims will not go to the
expense of auditing a holder's records.
The 1981 Act includes an interesting self-regulating feature that
reduces the possibility that holders will refuse to file unclaimed property
reports with the state of last known address since no benefit will be de-
rived from refusing. If a holder declines to file reports and to pay un-
claimed property to the first priority claimant, the state of the owner's
last known address, the second priority claimant, the state of corporate
'5' "Doing business" for purposes of service of process is limited only by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. On the
other hand, jurisdiction to regulate a foreign corporation in a substantive fashion must
run the gauntlet of the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3, the Equal Protection
Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1, and the Impairment of Contracts Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 10, cl. 1, as well as the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, S1. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (Delaware business not re-
quired to collect sales tax from Maryland purchasers even though business makes some
deliveries in Maryland).
16 See generally Last Knoum Address, supra note 126, at 570-77; supra note 157.
'5' See State v. Amsted Industries, 48 N.J. 544, 226 A.2d 715 (1967); supra note 128
and accompanying text.
160 Some states require holders to file negative reports, or to report that they have
no property payable to the state. See, e.g., VA. CODE S 55-210.12:1 (Supp. 1981). Presumably
a state with no jurisdiction over the holder could not require the filing of a negative report
since the state would not be regulating the succession and ownership of any unclaimed
property.
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domicile, could take custody under section 3 of the 1981 Act '. 6' The state
of corporate domicile may assert priority on either of two bases. The first
basis is that the state of the owner's last known address cannot be deter-
mined when the property is presumed abandoned under section 3(3)(i).
The second basis is that the state of the owner's last known address does
not have applicable legislation under section 3(4).162 The 1981 Act requires
the holder to report and ultimately pay over to the second priority clai-
mant, who would then hold the property in custody for the state of last
known address. The states then could adjust the claims among themselves
under the authority of section 25 which provides for state turnovers to
the state of last known address. The Act thereby bypasses the holder's
claim of lack of jurisdiction or other refusal to report." The procedure
authorized by section 25 is similar to the course taken by the Texas
Supreme Court in State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co.'"
In Liquidating Trustees, the court permitted the second priority claimant,
the state of Texas, to assert custody over property and hold property
for states of last known address because the first priority states could
not obtain jurisdiction over the holder in their own courts.'65 The provi-
sions for states' claims from each other in section 25 and for joint
agreements in section 33 should provide the necessary administrative in-
frastructure to effectively distribute property among the claimant states.
The growing concern for state revenues prompted many states to enter
into cooperative agreements to aid each other in the collection process. ' "
These agreements are of questionable legality under existing law and
holders initially evidenced skepticism about the validity of such
agreements. Nevertheless, many holders prefer dealing with one inquiry
rather than fifty. The 1981 Act seeks to encourage reciprocal agreements
through the provisions of section 33.161
The reciprocal agreements envisioned in section 33 do not require the
consent of Congress under the compact clause of the Constitution.68 The
Supreme Court has limited the the compact clause to combinations or
agreements that tend to increase the political power of states to such an
extent that the arrangements interfere with the supremacy of the United
States. In United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission,'69 the
Supreme Court upheld a tax compact that created a permanent ad-
... Uniform Unclaimed Property Act § 3(3)(ii) (1981).
... Id. 5 3(4). Section 3(4) deems the holder's failure to report to the state of last known
address to establish conclusively that the state had no applicable law. Id.
" See id. §§ 25(b), 25(c).
u 510 S.W.2d 311, 315 (Tex. 1974).
''Id.
' States entering into cooperative agreements include California, Illinois, Minnesota,
Massachusetts and Virginia, among others.
"6 See Uniforra Unclairned Property Act 5 33, comment (1981).
3 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10, cl. 3.
'434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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ministrative body to perform audits of multistate taxpayer operations and
to enforce the audits in the courts of the member states when requested.
Congress had not given approval to the compact. States could make similar
agreements under the authority granted by section 33 of the 1981 Act.
The agreements would provide an economical method to enforce individual
state claims under the Act. Each state would retain discretion to bring
suit or to forego a claim, thereby remaining free to adopt individual aban-
doned property policies.
Section 33 further authorizes one state to bring an action on behalf
of another."' In some cases, a state administrator may find it prudent
to seek counsel in a foreign jurisdiction. Small claims may not justify in-
dividual action by a claimant state in a foreign forum, but if several states
joined forces, economies of scale might warrant maintenance of the ac-
tion. Section 33 expressly permits joint actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in Texas v. New Jersey did not attempt, wisely we believe,
to establish the limit of state power to assert custody over intangible prop-
erty. To establish that limitation may well be an impossible task. Instead,
the Court did the next best thing by establishing an initial system of
priorities for resolving conflicting claims. To the extent that the law pro-
vides a mechanism for the resolution of competing claims, the need to
define absolute limits on state power is lessened. The 1981 Uniform Act,
likewise, does not attempt to define the limits of state power. Instead,
the Act builds on the initial system of priorities established by the Court
in Texas v. New Jersey. The Act's ancillary provisions for reporting, record
retention, and interstate cooperation should lessen the need to solve the
intractable problem of articulating ultimate limits on state power.
Any law that affects many persons with varied interests and that is
intended to resolve some of the most vexing conflicts between and among
states is bound to have ragged edges and lack the elegance of symmetry.
The Uniform Unclaimed Property Act is no exception. While law reformers
always seek elegant solutions to intractable problems, we generally must
be satisfied with more practical ones. The law would be neater if a state
authorized to claim property as a sovereign did not have to be concerned
that it might not be able to require holders to report directly to it. The
law would be neater if all abandoned property had a clear label identify-
-ing the name and last known address of the owner. But it is not to be
that way. A little chewing gum, a lot of bailing wire, and, one hopes, some
common sense went into drafting the 1981 Uniform Unclaimed Property
Act. With some common sense administration and good faith cooperation
among states and between states and holders, the Act can provide at least
a pragmatic solution to a series of rather important problems.
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